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The Limits Placed by EEC Law on
Territorial Protection in
Patent Licensing:
A Case Study in Community
Law-Making
DonaldL. Holley*

In this article,Mr. Holley examines the ways in which the EEC Commission's interpretationsof the EEC Treaty, European Courtdecisions, and
suggestions made by Member States andindustry influence the development
of EEClaw. Byfocusing on the Commission'sdraftpatentlicensingregulalion, the authoridentofes existing conflicts betweenpreservingpatent rights
andthe EEC objectives ofprotecting competition and thefreeflow ofgoods
among the Member States.

INTRODUCTION

For the past ten years, the Community bodies which make EEC

law, legal commentators, and organizations which influence the law's
development have been engaged in the intricate exercise of working out
the relationship between the provisions of the Treaty of Rome which
concern the free flow of goods and the protection of competition, and
those that guarantee industrial property rights. The relationship between these provisions will most likely be firmly established in the next
few years, but at the moment there is no clear set of rules. Thus, while
a definitive review of the territorial protection afforded licensors and
licensees under Community law cannot be made at this time, the cur* Partner, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, Brussels.
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rent legal situation does offer an interesting case study in EEC law-

making.
A major focal point of this study is the manner in which the various bodies and other forces that shape EEC law operate to influence
both one another and the law's development. A second point of con-

centration involves the process of finding the point at which certain
basic objectives of the Treaty-in particular market integration-give
way to another objective: preserving property rights such as patents.'
The patent licensor now faces the problem of attempting to discern this

point when he wants to afford himself territorial protection against
sales by a licensee, or to protect a licensee's territory against sales by
others. The resulting conflict between the parties' expectations and the

Community objectives presents a focal point from which to examine
the protection granted to competition and consumers by Articles 85 and
86 of the Treaty,2 the free flow of goods among the Member States by
Article 30, 3 and patent rights by Article 36. 4
Decisions by the Commission and the European Court over the
last decade have developed the issues relevant to this subject to a certain extent. Recently, the Commission sharpened its focus on these is-

sues when it proposed an important measure of Community legislation:
its draft patent licensing regulation.5 When issued in final form, that
measure will give a block exemption to certain exclusive grants and
1 No attempt will be made here to discuss similar questions which may arise regarding other
forms of industrial and intellectual property rights. It may simply be observed that the legal
answer will usually differ depending on what is deemed to be the "specific subject matter" of the
property right in question.
2 Article 85(1), prohibiting agreements or concerted practices that may affect trade between
Member States and that have as their object the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within the Community, is likely to raise issues in any patent license and will certainly do so
when territorial protection is involved. Article 86, concerning abuses of dominant positions, can
also be relevant in enforcing industrial property rights, but the provisions of this Article are usually not of importance in regard to the present question. In any event, it should be noted that as a
matter of Community law, the monopoly given by a patent will not in itself give rise to a dominant position within the meaning of Article 86.
3 Article 30 can be applied in this context to prohibit a national court of a Member State from
deciding that importation involves patent infringement when such a decision would produce an
effect equivalent to an import quota. See the review of Article 30 case law in van Themaat &
Gormley, ProhibitingRestrictions ofFree Trade within the Community: Alrticles 30-36 of the EEC
Treaty, 3 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 577 (1981).
4 Article 36 may be applied to prevent the application of Article 30 to protect the specific
subject matter of the patent right. For a review of the case law regarding Article 36, see id. at 60107.
5 The draft regulation was published at 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 58) 12-18 (1979). The
proposal has evoked extensive comment on both sides of the Atlantic. For a comparison between
the proposed EEC rules and existing U.S. rules, see Handier & Blechman, 4n American View of
the Common Market's ProposedGroup Exemptionfor PatentLicenses, 14 INT'L LAW. 403 (1980).
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other clauses in patent licenses. The proposal may never result in a

final regulation,6 but it seems likely that a regulation will eventually be
adopted7 in a form not fundamentally different from that now pro-

posed. As a step in Community rule-making, the publication of the
draft regulation must itself be seen as an event of major importance in
Community law. While the draft appears to be largely an expression of
the Commission's own views, it also seems to reflect significant input of

Member States and industry. The draft proposes norms on issues that
have not been treated in decisions, and those proposed norms now cannot be safely ignored by parties to a patent license. For purposes of the

present study, the draft regulation defines and illustrates the problems
as well as certain options for their solutions.8
THE BACKGROUND OF TRADITIONAL LICENSING LAW

When a patent license is granted on patents in one Member State,
the basic rights the licensee receives are limited to the jurisdiction for
which the license is granted. If the licensee sells the licensed product in

another Member State in which a parallel patent exists, the patentee,
and sometimes even an exclusive licensee for that territory, 9 may sue

for patent infringement in a court of that other Member State. Similarly, the first licensee in question can be assured that others selling into
6 While the Commission has been authorized by Council Regulation 19/65 to adopt the regulation without the consent of the Member States, a certain degree of opposition by Member States
may cause the Commission to refrain from adopting the regulation.
7 The regulation would perhaps already have been adopted had it not been thought by the
Commission that a 1978 decision of the Commission, subsequently brought before the European
Court for review, might resolve the issue of whether an exclusive grant of industrial property
rights and related territorial protection violates article 85(1). That case, Breeders' Rights-Maize
Seed, will probably be decided in 1982. The Commission decision was published in 21 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 286) 23 (1978).

8 A number of Commission officials and authoritative academic writers who have carefully
examined the legal questions underlying the present study have taken firm positions as to how the
law should develop. No attempt will be made here to give a comprehensive bibliography, but in
regard to expressions of views by officials we may in particular note H. JOHANNES, INDUSTRIAL
PROPERTY AND COPYRIGHT IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (1976). With regard to studies by
academic writers, a recent and detailed study can be found in P. DEMARET, PATENTS, TERRITORiAL RESTRICTIONS, AND EEC LAW (1978). See also Waelbroeck, The Effect ofthe Rome Treaty
21 ANTITRUST BULL. 99 (1976). This article
on theExercise ofNatinallndustrialPropertyRights,
does not attempt to predict the outcome of the important issues yet to be decided by Community
authorities, nor does it suggest which outcome seems desirable as a matter of policy. Rather, this
article focuses on the way the debate and interaction of these various forces have brought the law
to its present state of development.
9 In certain Member States, including Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, an
exclusive licensee is entitled to bring an action for patent infringement.
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his territory without having a license to do so will be subject to suits for
patent infringement.
On the basis of their experience throughout the world, many licensors and licensees have come to believe that territorial protection is not
only common practice and commercially useful but also evidence of
one of the fundamental rights attached to a patent. In particular, such
protection enhances the value of the patent because it allows the patentee to convince a licensee obtaining territorial protection to take a license and to pay an enhanced royalty of a certain amount. The
licensee is thus assured of being the exclusive party using the patent in
a particular area.
IMPLICATIONS OF COMMUNITY LAW

Following the founding of the European Economic Community in
1957, two patent law issues arose concerning these questions, which are
not immediately apparent. The first issue was the extent to which the
natural separation of the national markets within the Community resulting from national patent rights can, in the light of Article 85, legitimately be strengthened through contractual provisions. The question,
initially within the domain of decision by the Commission, cannot,
however, be usefully examined today without reference to how the European Court will decide the extent to which the right to sue for patent
infringement has been limited by Article 30 of the Treaty of Rome.
It was only after a number of years that legal writers began seriously to consider the possibility that infringement suits might be prevented by the Treaty.'" To the surprise of many close observers of
EEC law, in 1971 the European Court took a big step toward unifying
the market which then consisted of six Member States, at a certain expense to industrial and intellectual property rights, when it decided the
Deutsche Grammophon case." Although Deutsche Grammophon did
not involve a patent, the European Court's holding on the rights protecting recordings clearly suggested that in patent cases, the European
Court would hold that once a patented product had been sold or "put
on the market" in one Member State with the consent of the owner,
importation of the product into another Member State could not be
10 See, e.g., ALEXANDER, BREVETS D'INVENTION ET REGLES DE CONCURRENCE DU TRAITI

CEE (1971). Koch and Froschmaier proposed that Article 85 of the Treaty should prohibit territorial protection in The Doctrine of Territoriality in PatentLaw andthe European Common Market,
9 IDEA 343 (1965).
11 Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH. v. Metro-SB-Grossmarkte GmbH & Co., [1971]
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 487, [1971] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 631.
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prevented by a patent infringement suit based on a parallel patent of
common origin.12 The rule was further clarified a little over two years
later when the European Court decided Sterling Drug, a case which

expressly involved patents. 3 By that time the European Court's position was clear: relief in a patent infringement suit would in certain
circumstances be deemed an effect equivalent to an import quota prohibited by Article 30 of the Treaty of Rome and not protected by the
saving clause of Article 36.
Despite the uncertainties produced by Articles 30 and 36 in other
situations, 4 the general rule established by these European Court decisions indicates that, for example, a parallel importer having bought a
patented product from a U.K. patent licensee who has made the product under license in the United Kingdom can be assured upon exporting it to the Netherlands that neither the patentee who licensed the

U.K. company nor a Dutch licensee can rely15on a parallel Dutch patent
to prevent the import into the Netherlands.

A MAJOR UNRESOLVED ISSUE
While the rules formulated by the European Court in these cases
were both clear and had major commercial significance, they left unde-

cided the result of one situation which is of essential importance from
an industrial point of view: whether to allow suits for patent infringement when the product had not been "put on the market" prior to export to the other EEC countries. In other words, what if the U.K.
12 Id. at 502, [1971] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 659.
13 Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1147, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 480. In this case involving parallel patents, the Court did not deal with the existence of a
parallel patent in the Member State where the product had first been put on the market, but only
with the product's having been put on the market by the patent holder or with his consent.
14 The variety of situations encountered, the complexity of the analysis and the disparity between the approaches taken by the Commission and the European Court are described by van
Themaat & Gormley, Prohibiting Restrictions of Free Trade within the Community: 4rticles 30-36
ofthe EEC Treaty, 3 Nw. 3. INT'L L. & Bus. 577 (1981).
15 Although no case has involved products manufactured by a licensee unrelated to the licensor's group except by the license contract, there seems to be no reason to make a distinction. This
point has been examined by Johannes, supra note 8, at 66-67. Questions will, of course, arise in
special situations, such as when no patent can be granted in the country of manufacture. See
Parke, Davis & Co. v. Probel--Centrafarm, [1968] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 55, [1968] Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 47. See also, Merck & Co., Inc. v. Stephar BV,23 O.J. EuPL COMM. (No. C 260) 4 (1980).
Another example is when the patent has expired in the country in which the goods are produced.
See Dymo Industries, Inc., v. Etiketten Service Arnhem BV,23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 17) 1011 (1980). This case has now been withdrawn. A further question involves goods produced under
a compulsory license. See Pharmon BV v. Hoechst AG, 23 O.J. EuR. Comm.(No. C 347) 28

(1980).
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licensee had exported directly to the Netherlands?16 Middlemen are

not employed in the export of certain raw materials and many capital
goods. Thus market integration would not be achieved by the rules as
so far developed without the possibility of direct sales by a licensee.
Even when middlemen are used, the licensee is often in a better position to make export sales than middlemen-for various reasons-

which include better familiarity with the product, price advantage, and
ability to predict and control product quantities available for export.

According to the prevailing view, in such instances, the product is not
considered to have been "put on the market," as the European Court

has consistently phrased the rule in its holdings thus far.17
Under EEC law, the remaining question is not one to be resolved

by the Commission, because its decision-making power in these matters
extends only to Articles 85 and 86. Rather, the European Court must
decide the issue when a Member State court refers the matter to the
European Court for an interpretation of Articles 30 and 36. The European Court will almost certainly have the occasion to examine the

question in due course, but it is not clear how thb Court will approach
the question, or how it will decide it. It appears that the Court will
probably approach the issue by recognizing that giving effect to the patent right in an infringement suit brought under these circumstances

would be essentially equivalent to an import quota within the meaning
of Article 30 that must be prohibited unless, within the meaning of Article 36, permitting the infringement suit is found necessary to protect
the specific subject matter of the patent right in the state of import.'
Opinion is divided as to whether the European Court should find
territorial protection necessary to protect the specific subject matter of

the patent right, 19 but at least all interested parties will have the oppor16 For purposes of the issues in question, sale by an independent U.K. licensee to a company
in the United Kingdom belonging to its own group which then exported to the Netherlands would
presumably be deemed a direct export.
17 It has been argued that the patentee's granting a license, perhaps combined with production
by the licensee, is itself a "putting onto the market." This position was expressed by Johannes in
the 1979 hearings organized by the Commission in connection with the draft patent licensing
regulation. Johannes bases his view principally on the concept that the "specific subject matter" to
be protected is not the various national patents but rather the invention. The European Court's
phrasing of its ruling in Sterling Drug, lends some support to this view. See Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1147, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 480.
18 This is the approach adopted by Johannes, supra note 15, at 70-75.
19 Johannes seems to recognize that a patentee's protection against sales by a licensee may in
some cases be necessary to preserve the existence of the patent licensor's rights, id. at 73, but
nevertheless finds such protection incompatible with a unified market. Johannes finally concludes
that the protection should not be deemed a part of the existence of the patent right, or, in other
words, of the specific subject matter. Id. at 74.
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tunity to present their views. The Member States have considered the
matter at various times and at one point left the impression that they
would like the Court to permit such protection when they adopted Article 43(2) of the Community Patent Convention.2" Despite the fact that
the Member States are being consulted by the Commission regarding
the patent licensing regulation, the Member States acting individually,
will have the opportunity to reiterate their views by arguing as interested parties when the issue arises before the European Court.
Because no prediction can confidently be made regarding the
Court's decision of this issue, licensors and licensees for the time being
are left to speculate. Some licensors may be in no hurry to have an
answer because they believe that licensees, faced with such uncertainties, will exercise restraint. Licensors may also fear that the final answer of the European Court will be one they do not want to hear. Even
the Commission itself may not have determined what position it will
take in its own arguments before the Court." Another factor that may
tend to restrain either a licensor or licensee from suing for infringement
is that upon learning of the suit, the Commission may charge that the
licensing grants on which the suit is based infringe the competition
rules of Article 85, and perhaps Article 86. This other legal aspect, to a
great extent under the control of the Commission, is closely related to
the Article 30 question, yet at the same time is quite distinct from it.
THE IMPACT OF ARTICLE

85

The other half of the problem involving the competition rules
based on Articles 85 and 86 is primarily within the domain of the Commission. Even though the European Court will make the final ruling
on any appeal from a Commission decision, the Commission initiates
policy formation and makes decisions that are binding unless overturned on appeal. Iii practice, this often means that for a substantial
period of time an entire area of law will be regulated solely by the
20 The official title of the Convention, which is not yet in force, is the Convention for the
European Patent for the Common Market. The provision in question states: "The rights conferred by the Community patent may be invoked against a licensee who contravenes any restriction in his license which is covered by paragraph 1." Paragraph 1 recognizes that a license can be
granted for a part of the Community.
21 As indicated at note 19 supra, Johannes, who at present heads the Industrial Property
Rights section of the Commission's Competition Directorate-General, took the position in his

1976 book that infringement relief could not be granted in the country of import. He was speaking in his personal capacity, of course, and it remains to be seen what position the Commission
will take in arguments before the European Court. It may be noted, however, that in discussions
with the Member States on the Community Patent Convention, the Commission opposed Article
43(2). See note 20 supra.
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Commission. So far, this has been the case for patent licensing, where
the Commission's 1962 Notice governed the field until the series of
Commission cases began in 1971. Further, none of the issues treated in
the Notice or in the Commission cases has yet been decided by the

European Court.
Obviously harmony between the two sets of rules is highly desira-

ble. In order to avoid confusion, any final legal solution must take into
account both the set of rules based on Articles 30 and 36 and those
based on Article 85 so that the scope of one set of rules is not basically

incompatible with the other. Before examining the joint solution proposed by the Commission in its draft patent licensing regulation, we
shall review briefly the Commission's treatment of the basic antitrust
issues involved.
As interpreted by the European Court, Article 85(1)22 prohibits restrictive agreements or concerted practices that have or may have an
appreciable effect on competition within one or more of the Member
States. Applicability of Article 85(1), however, depends on whether the
normal flow of trade between twp or more Member States may be affected, directly or indirectly, to an appreciable extent. From the text
alone, the Article appears to be concerned exclusively with the furtherance of competition. In practice, however, the analysis of competitive
effect is often given secondary importance by the Community authorities when they focus on their determination to further the integration of
the market. Under this approach, it seems inevitable that the infringement of Article 85(1) which will provoke the surest condemnation (and
often substantial fines) is a prohibition, hindrance, or disincentive relating to exports or imports from another part of the Community. An
agreement or concerted practice with such a purpose or effect is not
only aperse violation unless it escapes under the de minimis exception
(of truly minimal interest to most parties); 3 an agreement having that
effect has always appeared to have little chance of being exempted
under Article 85(3).24
22 See note 2 supra.
23 Under the Commission's Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. C 313) 3-4 (1977), in principle, a restriction will not be deemed to have an appreciable effect
on competition if two criteria are met: if it affects not more than 5 percent of the product market
in a substantial part of the Common Market, and the worldwide turnover in all product lines of
the groups which are parties to the agreement does not exceed 50 million ECU (currently about
U.S. $52 million).
24 The Commission has normally considered that an export prohibition can be refused an
exemption on the basis of any one of the first three of the four criteria of Article 85(3):
(i) contribution to improving the production or distribution of goods or promoting technical
or economic progress, while
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In the area of distribution, EEC law on clauses affecting exports to

other parts of the Community is relatively clear.25 Whether an export
prohibition should be treated the same way when included in a patent
license however, has been questioned. Export to a country outside the
territory would not be feasible if patent infringement results in the
country of import and if there were no Treaty or other obstacle to an
infringement suit. It may be argued that such an export prohibition

would not be an appreciable restriction of competition because an infringement suit could be brought against the exporter.2 6 In such circumstances, the contractual export prohibition might be seen as giving

the licensor only an alternative remedy. In some cases, of course, restrictive effects could still be discerned from any export prohibition.

The patent might be too weak to withstand challenge in the country of
importation, or it might be easier for the licensor to sue on contract or
go to arbitration for violation of a license clause than to sue for infringement. As a matter of law, however, it seems that the restraint

might well be appreciable in some circumstances, particularly, for example, when the patent is weak. Thus, even if the licensor were later
assured that Article 36 would be interpreted in a way favorable to him
so as to allow an infringement suit, he could not be assured of immu-

nity from prosecution by the Commission which has opposed such
clauses, nor could the licensor be certain of succeeding in a national
court if he were to sue on contract.
(ii) allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and
(iii) not imposing restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; and
(iv) not affording the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part
of the products in question.
No export prohibition has yet been exempted. Certain restrictions which limit the ability to export
have, however, been granted a block exemption by Commission Regulation 67/67, relating to
exclusive distribution. In Distillers Company Ltd v. Commission, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
2229, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 121, one of the issues before the European Court was the possibility of an exemption for a pricing policy that impeded exports in order to protect exclusive
distributors; however, the case was decided on another issue.
25 One minor but certainly interesting exception is that raised in the Distillers case, note 24
supra. Official policy is so strongly against clauses adversely affecting exports or imports within
the Community that once such a restriction has been found, the parties imposing it will be in
serious danger of a substantial fine unless covered by a notification or by the block exemption of
Commission Regulation 67/67. The remaining doubt concerns not the principle of law but the
interpretation of circumstances that will be deemed to constitute a disincentive to exports.
26 Jaume, then a director in the Commission's Competition Directorate-General, took this
position in
accords de licences et rkgles de concurrence, 15 REVUE DU MARCHL- COMMUN 674
(1972).
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THE APPROACH OF THE DRAFT REGULATION

The Commission began establishing its precedents concerning the
relevance of Article 85 to patent licensing late in 1971 when it exempted exclusive patent manufacturing licenses covering a part of the
Community on condition that the licensee was granted no exclusive
sales rights within the Community and obtained non-exclusive sales
rights for all the Community.2 7 By imposing such a condition, the
Commission avoided giving the licensor or another licensee the opportunity of suing for infringement when the licensee exported elsewhere
in the Community. It was not until late 1975 that the Commission even
referred to the possibility of there being circumstances in which it
might be willing to exempt an export prohibition imposed on the
licensee.28
Commission and Court decisions had clearly developed the issues
arising under Articles 30 and 36 and Article 85 when the Commission
completed another in a series of drafts of its patent licensing regulations which it was prepared to publish as the definitive draft in March
of 1979.
In its draft, the Commission proposed to treat an export prohibition directed at another part of the Community no more severely than
an exclusive sales right granted with regard to an EEC patent. The
draft demonstrates what had become fairly evident from preceding
cases: the Commission has decided to give priority to integration of the
Community market, except for temporary protection of relatively small
parties, regardless of the protection that may or may not eventually be
held by the European Court to be available against direct exports by
licensees outside their territories.
In preparing its draft, the Commission faced at least two major
uncertainties. The first is whether the European Court will eventually
hold that the grant of an exclusive sales right in a patent license is not
in itself a violation of Article 85(1) because such a grant is "within the
scope" of the patent. A number of industry circles have strongly urged
this view upon the Commission. This approach excludes whatever is
within the "scope" of the patent from the reach of Article 85(1); it is not
necessarily inconsistent with the now-accepted approach of defining the
reach of the Treaty prohibitions by referring to the "subject matter" or
the "existence" of the patent, as opposed to the exercise of the patent.
27 Burrougs-Delplanque, 15 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 13) 50-52 (1972); Davidson Rubber
Co., 15 J.0. COMM. EuR. (No. L 143) 31-38 (1972).
28 AOIP/Beyrard, 19 O.J. EUR. Comm. (No. L 6) 8-15 (1976).
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Nevertheless, using the test of the patent's "scope" tends to extend the
domain that was in principle immune from attack under Article 85(1).
Regardless of which test is used, if the Court were to hold that an
exclusive patent license is not subject to attack under Article 85(1)
merely because of its exclusivity, the Commission would be obliged to
make a fundamental change in its approach in the patent licensing
regulation.
The second question is whether the Court will eventually hold that
a patent infringement suit cannot be used to stop imports from direct
sales by licensees in other parts of the Community. In view of the relationship of the two issues, it is questionable whether the Court would
be likely to hold exclusive sales grants in patent licenses immune from
attack under Article 85(1) and at the same time hold that infringement
suits cannot be brought because of the prohibition of Article 30. In
preparing the patent licensing regulation, the Commission obviously
could not afford to base its draft on one assumption to the exclusion of
the other. The Commission sought market unity and had to cover
every possibility, even if it resulted in certain undesirable side effects.
Thus, if the regulation is adopted without change in this respect2 9
and the Court does not hold exclusive sales grants immune from attack
under Article 85(1), the Commission will obtain a result which an eventual holding of the Court permitting infringement suits by virtue of
Article 36 would not change with regard to the majority of licensing
situations since exclusive sales grants would not be permitted. On the
other hand, if the Court were to hold that as a result of the prohibition
of Article 30 and the lack of protection of Article 36, the licensee can,
freely export to other parts of the Community, even in the absence of a
grant of sales rights under parallel patents in those countries, the Com29 Article 1(2) of the draft regulation as published in March 1979 provides in relevant part:
Exclusivity of sales and analogous prohibitions of the sale of patented products outside the
licensed territory shall be exempted... only:
(a) Where the total annual turnover of the licensor or licensee whose market is to be
protected by an export ban imposed on the other party or on another licensee does not exceed
100 million units of account; [the exemption] ... shall remain applicable not withstanding
that this turnover is exceeded by up to 10% in two consecutive financial years; in calculating
total turnover, sales of goods and services recorded in the last financial year by the undertaking concerned and all undertakings having economic connections with it shall be taken into
account; and
(b) if the exclusivity of sales and export bans have been agreed at most for the duration
of the most recent patent existing at the time when the agreement was entered into; this
period may not be extended in respect of such obligations by licensing agreements in respect
of patents for new applications or improvements; and
(c) if the patented product or product manufactured by the patented process may be
sold throughout the community by commercial undertakings which have no economic connections with the licensor or licensees; and
(d) if the licensee either manufactures the licensed products himself, or has them manufactured by an undertaking that has economic connections with him.
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mission's restrictions in its patent licensing regulation on grants of exclusive sales rights would not have been necessary to have achieved a
market unity and would have significant broader implications for the
parties to a license. The system contemplated by the proposed block
exemption regulation limits the possibility for a licensor to assume the
obligation not to ship into the territory of the licensee, whether or not
that licensor was producing within the Community. In most cases, the
system also prevents the licensee from being able to sue for infringement upon the introduction into his territory of goods produced under
a parallel patent outside the Community since he would not be an "exclusive" licensee.3 °
The draft regulation indicates a clear choice by the Commission in
favor of market integration. Apart from exceptional cases that might
be found entitled to an individual exemption, patent rights are to be
used to protect a licensee within the Community from sales from other
Community countries only when the licensee is small enough to be
deemed in need of protection. Under the draft as published by the
Commission, weakness is defined only in terms of group turnover.3 ' In
discussions with industry circles, however, the Commission has indicated that a more developed criterion is desirable, if one could be

found that was subject to precise application. Thus, the final criterion
may be more complex and closer to the market realities.3 2
30 The Commission would, of course, take the position that the prohibition against exclusive
licenses, whether or not they relate to market unity, comes from Article 85(1), as shown by a
number of Commission decisions. According to the Commission, the block exemption regulation
is meant to liberalize that rather strict rule by putting into effect an automatic "rule of reason"
permitting exclusive manufacturing licenses regardless of the size of the parties, and also exclusive
sales rights when accompanied by manufacturing rights in instances when the protected party is
relatively small. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that in working out any system, the considerable incursion of EEC law on what had always been deemed a proper exercise of patent rights
can be explained primarily by the imperatives of market unity within the Community. The system contemplated by the block exemption regulation, when read in conjunction with the Commission's interpretation of Article 85(1), denies a licensor the right to give an exclusive license by
which the licensee can achieve some degree of protection even when market unity is not involved.
This result, of course, offers certain advantages from the point of view of increased competition,
but it has nothing to do with Community market integration. It is by no means clear that the
Commission would have required such limitations on a licensee's rights to protection in the absence of the over-riding consideration of market unity.
31 See note 29 supra.
32 Article 1(2) of the draft regulation exempts a grant of sales exclusivity to a licensee only if
the annual worldwide turnover of the licensee's group did not exceed 100 million ECU. In the
October 1979 hearing, the Commission gave interested parties the opportunity to express their
opinions concerning the draft regulation. A great deal of attention was focused on the turnover
criterion, which a number of parties criticized as being arbitrary. While the Commission did not
indicate at that time any decision to abandon the turnover criterion set forth in the draft regulation, it has shown an interest in pursuing an alternative criterion that would take into account
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While insisting upon market integration for the larger parties, the
draft regulation presents at the same time a noteworthy and almost surprising concession to the needs of licensing parties by permitting the

use of export prohibitions to protect small- and medium-sized businesses through a block exemption. This development is noteworthy be-

cause, as observed earlier, export prohibitions within the Community
have not been permitted in any EEC case except in the rare de minimis

situations.33
The regulation as presently proposed would not permit an export
prohibition to be used to protect a market within the Community
where no valid patent exists. 34 Thus, if a licensor granted rights in a
patent license under both patents and related know-how, and in one
Member State no patent had been obtained and no patent application

was pending, the regulation would not permit protection of that market
regardless of the weakness of the party to be protected on that
market.3 5
THE PRESENT

Major undecided issues and important unadopted regulations
leave licensing parties uncertain about the effects of their contractual

arrangements. First, the situation described above obviously presents a
dilemma of considerable proportions for licensors and licensees who
think they need to obtain or give some territorial protection within the

Community. For the time being, in many situations they can proceed
to grant exclusive licenses for both manufacture and sale without concern that the Commission will consider such grants an intentional or
negligent violation that would result in fines. 36 However, the parties
will not know what effect their agreements will have in the courts, even
turnover in all or a part of the Common Market or in the relevant product line and that might or
might not be combined with worldwide turnover in a single formula. In addition, the Commission might consider an alternative criterion based on market share, with the exemption being
available if either the turnover or market share criteria were met.
33 See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
34 See Article 3(13) of the draft regulation, note 5 supra.
35 While the proposed rule represents a policy decision by the Commission, the result is also
perhaps suggested by the more technical consideration that to allow a protection of a territory
where no patent exists would not be within the scope of a patent licensing regulation. Such protection could presumably be given in a regulation granting a block exemption in regard to knowhow agreements.
36 In a notice accompanying the publication of the draft regulation, supra note 5, at 12, the
Commission indicated that parties conducting their affairs in accordance with the Commission's
1962 Notice on Patent Licensing Agreements would not be fined. With respect to grants of sales
exclusivity, the 1962 Notice sets forth the Commission's view that an agreement by a licensor with
a licensee not to authorize anyone else to exploit the invention and not to exploit the invention
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in the near future; both the exclusive manufacturing and sales rights
may be found void because they violate Article 85(1). The parties can
decide to resort to exclusive manufacturing rights alone with the assurance that they will eventually be covered by the block exemption when
the patent licensing regulation is adopted. However, the licensor will
often want to give more market protection than the exclusive manufacturing rights alone would carry. Some products can easily be transported throughout the Community with little or no obstruction from
transport costs or other factors. The need for protection in addition to
exclusive manufacturing rights becomes of even greater importance as
the Community becomes more fully unified due to the lack of technical
and other barriers to selling throughout the ten-Member State area.
One alternative is for the parties to enter into an agreement granting full territorial protection through exclusive manufacturing and
sales rights and export bans, and then to notify the Commission of the
license agreement in a request for an exemption under Article 85(3).
Many parties hesitate to notify the Commission of the license agreement, however, because of the real or imagined difficulties created by
requests for an exemption. The parties have to assume that the Commission probably will grant an exemption for complete territorial protection only if the circumstances are either somewhat like those of the
draft regulation, i.e., the clause protects a party presumably needing
protection, or if some exceptional circumstances can be shown. It is by
no means clear what types of exceptional circumstances the Commission will consider convincing.
Another possibility is for the licensor to impose no export prohibition but simply to grant the licensee no sales rights outside the territory.
The licensor will hope to be able to sue for infringement if the licensee
sells outside his territory. The licensee would, however, have to assume
that the person pursued for infringement of a patent of a Member State
would be likely to raise the issue of Article 30 before the national court
as a defense to the infringement suit and that the case would be referred to the European Court.
THE FUTURE

For most prospective contracting parties, the most significant and
immediate question is whether there will be a block exemption regulation for patent licenses and what form it will take. It seems likely that a
regulation will be adopted in due course and that its provisions in rehimself does not infringe Article 85(l). However, the Notice also states, in a sentence sometimes
overlooked by those who purport to rely on it, that it does not cover multiple parallel licenses.
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gard to the questions considered here will not be fundamentally different from those in the published draft.37
Despite the undisputed importance of the patent licensing regulation, it appears that adoption of the regulation will not affect the more
economically important licenses, except to settle the issue of exclusive
manufacturing grants and whatever territorial protection may result
from them. Most exclusive sales grants or export prohibitions included
in such patent licenses are designed to protect relatively important
companies. Under the regulation as proposed, the permissibility of exclusive sales grants or export prohibitions under Article 85(1) will continue to depend on the possibility of a specific exemption under Article
85(3) based on the facts of the individual case.
In most cases, a licensee cannot legally be given an exclusive sales
grant without an exemption under present Commission decisions.
However, at least until the European Court decides otherwise, a patentee can protect a non-exclusive licensee against another licensee who
makes direct sales into the first licensee's territory without having a
right under the patent to sell into that territory by suing for infringement. To prevent such infringement suits, the Commission would have
to hold that a licensor violates Article 85(1) by failing to grant all licensees non-exclusive sales rights throughout the Community. At present,
there seems to be no indication that the Commission will do so.
Rather, it appears that regardless of the final wording of the patent
licensing regulation, Articles 30 and 36 will retain their importance in
the majority of the economically important cases. The final solution to
this problem will thus depend to a very large extent on the European
Court.
CONCLUSION

The final shape of the legal rules apparently will be determined as
a matter of Community policy rather than as a reflection of the strictly
juridical point of view. The central question for both the European
Court and the Commission will be whether the Community goal of
furthering market unity among the ten Member States will override the
important economic interests that parties think justifiably attach to patents. Important questions are yet to be settled by the Commission, in
cases that are not yet in progress. These cases must be decided in the
light of the European Court's decisions in cases either before it or yet to
37 The European Court's decision in the pending Breeders' RJghts-Maize Seed case could, of
course, require fundamental changes in the regulation's approach to these questions. See 21 OJ.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 286) 23 (1978) for the Commission decision.
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be filed. Meanwhile, both industry circles and Member States continue
to press their views upon the Commission. The dialogue between the
various bodies which affect EEC law and the Community authorities is
not fully open to public view, but we may hope that the authorities will
determine only after due deliberation this important point of equilibrium between market unity and patent rights.

